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1Tollensing van Inwagen
Van Inwagen (1990) has an ingenious argument for the non-existence of human artefacts
(and other non-living complex things). But the argument cannot be accepted, since human
artefacts are everywhere.1 However, it cannot be ignored. The proper response to it is to
treat it as a refutation of its least plausible premise, i.e., to ‘tollens’ it. In the following I first
set out van Inwagen’s argument. I then identify its least plausible premise and explain the
consequence of denying it. I argue that denying it is not so difficult, since on reflection its
denial is an easy consequence of ordinary beliefs. I finish by explaining why, despite his best
efforts, van Inwagen has not persuaded me that it may be true that artefacts do not exist and
conclude that nothing stands in the way of tollensing van Inwagen and accepting the
consequence of doing so.
Van Inwagen’s argument for the non-existence of artefacts can be set out as follows.
If I touch shoulders with someone in a crowd, or shake hands with them, nothing new comes
into existence as a result of our encounter. If we become momentarily paralysed as we shake
hands, still nothing new comes into existence. The same is true if we become glued together
or tied together as we shake hands, or even if our flesh is melted so that no boundary is
discernible between us. In all these cases of contact or various kinds of bonding nothing new
of which we are parts is brought into existence as a result of our coming to be so related.
But the relations just identified include all the kinds of spatial and causal relations
which are created between bits of wood when, as we would ordinarily say, a chair is made.
However, ‘whether certain objects add up to or compose a larger object does not depend on
anything besides the spatial and causal relations they bear to one another’ (van Inwagen
1990: 12, this is van Inwagen’s tenth listed constraint on his theorizing). For example,
1 Of course, the sceptic about the external world will deny my claim to know this. But this is no help to van
Inwagen. His claim is not that I do not know that human artefacts exist, but that they do not, though there are
material particles, some arranged ‘chairwise’, some ‘tablewise’ etc. (and plants and animals). This is equally
open to challenge by the external world sceptic.
2nothing outside the region of space containing some bricks is relevant to the question whether
there is anything they compose; and, in particular, the beliefs, attitudes and interests of any
persons are irrelevant. This may be admitted, it may be rejoined to van Inwagen, but it may
still be said that you and I, however bonded, do not compose a third object, whilst the bits of
wood glued and tied together compose a chair, because it matters for whether composition
takes place not only what relations obtain between the putative parts, but also what kind of
thing they are; and bonding relations sufficient for composition to occur when things of one
kind (e.g., bits of wood) are so bonded need not be sufficient for composition to occur when
things of a distinct kind (say, people) are so bonded, even if things are of the latter kind can
be bonded exactly as things of the former kind are when they compose something. But this
rejoinder is deeply implausible, for as van Inwagen notes, ‘[one might say] that if inanimate
objects are fastened to one another, they thereby compose something, but that if living
organisms are fastened to one another, they nevertheless do not compose anything. But what
could justify such discrimination; if the operation fastening has the power to turn inanimate
objects into the parts of a whole, why doesn’t this operation have the same power with
respect to living organisms?’ (van Inwagen 1990: 68).2
But if a new thing composed of bits of wood is not brought into existence when bits
of wood are bonded together in the sort of way we describe as ‘making a chair’, no chairs
have ever been made, and if no chairs have ever been made there never have been any chairs,
or, of course, any other human artefacts.
As I said, I think that this is an ingenious argument. But its conclusion is false. So the
appropriate response is to regard it as a refutation of its least plausible premise. This is the
2 The plausibility of the thought behind the rhetorical question here – that if you can make an artefact of a
certain kind out of certain inanimate components, you can make an artefact of that same kind out of animate
components, as long as they are capable of performing the right functional job – is illustrated by the example
given below of the whip made of snakes.
3contention that when people come to be bonded nothing new comes into existence of which
they are parts.
Suppose we deny this. Then we have to say that when you and I come to be bonded
together in one of the ways described a new thing comes into existence of which we are parts.
And, of course, we must accept that whenever any things becomes so bonded together ,
whatever kind or kinds of thing they are, something new is brought into existence of which
they are parts. So far this does not require us to say that when two people merely come into
contact they come to compose something new. But this conclusion is not far away. For, of
course, I can make an artefact, e.g., a child’s wooden brick house, merely by bringing objects
into contact (and the house may last only for the space of a handshake if the child is bored
and naughty). Van Inwagen’s argument can be used to conclude that I cannot, since people
do not come to compose something new just when they come into contact. But it is just as
false that no one has ever made a toy house out of wooden bricks as that no one has ever
made a chair, so we must reverse van Inwagen’s reasoning and conclude that when two
people come into contact something new comes into existence. Hence, we must conclude,
whenever two things, of any kind or kinds, come into contact something new, of which they
are parts, comes into existence.
Thus reversing van Inwagen’s reasoning leads to a plenitudinous ontology. However,
it does not immediately commit one to Universalism, the thesis that necessarily, if things are
disjoint there is a whole they compose. But this thesis is not a great reach now, and certainly
using the reversal of van Inwagen’s reasoning it is easy to conclude that things, inanimate or
animate, can compose a whole without being in contact, for some artefacts (or other products
of intentional human activity)3 consist of disconnected parts (and, of course, as van Inwagen
3 Rock gardens; bird cages consisting of magnetically suspended and spatially separated bits of wire, space
stations with separated living quarters and ablution blocks, the USA.
4notes (1990: 34),4 anyone who is moderately scientifically educated and believes in non-
living composites at all, will say this is true of atoms and molecules and all the things they
compose). And if contact is not necessary, albeit sufficient, what can be necessary? But
Universalism, together with the doctrine of plenitude, entails (a weak form of) pluralism, the
thesis that two non-identical things can share all their parts at a time (though not necessarily
at all times). Van Inwagen denies this thesis, but it seems to be the natural conclusion if his
argument is reversed in the way recommended.
But is not the claim that no new object comes into existence when two people are
bonded utterly plausible? Actually, I think not. Van Inwagen allows (1990: 35) that it is
plausible that when one builds a model of Salisbury Cathedral out of wooden blocks one has
brought into existence something they compose. And he will not deny that when the cue ball
rebounds from the eight ball a short-lived object is created (he says that there may be no
answer to the question laid up in heaven). But he insists later: ‘it is pretty clear that one
cannot bring a composite object into existence by bonding two human beings – or two living
organisms of any sort – to each other. And the corresponding thesis about any number of
human beings would also seem to be true’ (van Inwagen 1990: 62). And he adds in a
rhetorical footnote ‘Try to imagine bringing something into existence by gluing hamsters or
snakes together’ (van Inwagen 1990: 287).
But nothing is easier. Van Inwagen himself at one point imagines weaving a very
long, thin, tough snake into a hammock. Imagine instead tying together two or more shortish,
flexible snakes to make a whip. Anyone who believes that we can create artefacts at all must
allow that we can do this. But now imagine another possible world, in which perhaps there
are no human beings at all, but the snakes come to be bound together by accident, by ‘cosmic
4 ‘... it is undeniably true that, if there are any composite material objects at all, they are composed of elementary
particles and the elementary particles that compose a given material object are not in contact.’
5coincidence’ as it were. If we accept van Inwagen’s thesis that whether certain objects add up
to or compose some larger object does not depend on anything besides the spatial and causal
relations which they have to one another, which I think is not just an assumption of van
Inwagen’s but something that is appealing to common-sense also, we must say that in this
other possible world too there is an object composed of the snakes – though, of course, it is
not a whip, since to be a whip is to be something created by human beings with flagellatory
intentions, or at least something used by human beings for a flagellatory purpose, i.e., to be a
whip is to possess a certain relational property which the whole composed of the snakes in
the ‘cosmic coincidence’ world does not possess.
However, if something comes into existence when some snakes get entangled,
whether or not any human agency is involved, equally something comes into existence when
two men are bound together, whether or not human agency is involved.5 And since it is
obvious that one can make an artefact, with suitable intentions, just by bringing some living
things into contact (one might stuff a mattress with hamsters, though it would be useful to
sedate them first to stop them wriggling), by the same reasoning one can conclude that their
merely coming into contact is enough to make two human beings parts of a new whole.6
So, I claim, it is a fairly easy consequence of premises that are appealing to common-
sense – i.e., the general assumptions van Inwagen’s own argument relies on, together with the
5 So, it should be noted, van Inwagen’s only argument that fastening does not suffice for composition collapses,
since it rests on the false claim that ‘it is certainly not true that an object composed of you and me comes into
existence at the instant our [entwined] fingers become paralysed’ (1990: 58).
6 But then, why has van Inwagen’s initial ‘handshake’ example (1990: 35) encountered so little resistance?
When people touch shoulders, or shake hands then, in the absence of appropriate intentions, no new artefact is
brought into existence (contrast, a wall of policemen standing shoulder to shoulder again rioters, a Conga line, a
handshake posed for painting or sculpting). Nor is the short-lived object such free, unconstrained, human agents
compose easily conceived as usable as an artefact (unlike rocks, mountains and molecules, arrangements of
wooden bricks, accidentally entangled snakes, or objects composed of people glued together or ‘daisy-chained’
together by a mad surgeon (van Inwagen 1990: 59)). But we tend to ignore things we cannot see as having a
purpose or being in some way usable for a purpose. However, whether or not this is true, it remains that it is an
easy consequence of our everyday beliefs that there is something that comes into being whenever people come
into contact – even if we are not disposed, in certain cases, to accept it, or even disposed to reject it.
6thought he oddly rejects, that it is no more difficult to make composite objects out of living
beings than out of non-living beings – that when people are bonded together, or even merely
brought into contact, new things come into existence.
I said that I would finish by explaining why I am not persuaded by van Inwagen’s
attempt to explain why his conclusion that there are no artefacts, or non-living complexes
generally, is not just to be rejected out of hand (see also Hirsch, 1993).
This thesis is part of what van Inwagen calls ‘the Denial’, and he argues strenuously
that the Denial does not contradict our ordinary beliefs.7 His most careful attempt to do this
appeals to the fable of the bligers. I think that we can see why van Inwagen’s thesis is
unacceptable by seeing how the analogy he attempts to draw fails.
Van Inwagen takes great care to explain, as clearly as he can, what, in his view, the
Denial means:
There are certain properties a thing would have to have to be properly called a ‘table’
on anyone’s understanding of the word, and nothing has all of these properties. If
anything did have them it would be real, a true object, actually a thing, a substance, a
unified whole, and something more than a collection of particles. But nothing does. If
there were tables they would be composite material objects, and every composite
material object is real, a true object, actually a thing, a substance, a unified whole, and
something more than a collection of particles. But there are no tables. (1990: 100)
Nevertheless, van Inwagen thinks, the Denial as he means it, speaking as a
metaphysician (1990: 101), is consistent with what we commonly mean, not speaking as
metaphysicians, when we say such things as ‘there are two valuable eighteenth century
antique tables in the next room’. For any of the propositions that an English speaker might
7 Others (e.g., Merricks) deny the existence of artefacts but do not attempt this reconciliation. They are not the
topic of this paper. I think that the premises of their arguments are as easily deniable as van Inwagen’s.
However, my main aim is not to engage in this dispute but to get clear about the (plenitudinous, pluralist)
ontological commitment of everyday belief.
7express by uttering this sentence on a particular occasion is consistent with the proposition
that he, van Inwagen, expresses by saying, speaking metaphysically, ‘there are no tables’.
But are these propositions consistent with what English speakers, not speaking
metaphysically, express by uttering ‘there are no tables’? If so, what an ordinary English
speaker expresses by ‘there are two valuable eighteenth century antique tables in the next
room’ does not entail what he would express, not speaking metaphysically, by uttering ‘There
are tables’. Does it then entail what he would express, not speaking as a metaphysician, by
‘there are two valuable antique tables in the next room’, ‘there are two valuable tables in the
next room’, ‘there are antique tables’, ‘there are valuable tables’, ‘there are tables in the next
room’, ‘there are still some eighteenth century tables in existence’, ‘there are still (post-
nuclear holocaust) some tables in existence (though no chairs)’ – where does one draw the
line? It seems both an extraordinary claim that the entailment does not hold and one that van
Inwagen never actually attempts to defend. But suppose, on the other hand, that what
ordinary English speakers, not speaking metaphysically, would express by uttering ‘There are
tables’ is entailed by the propositions they would express on particular occasions, also not
speaking metaphysically, by uttering ‘There are two valuable eighteenth century antique
tables in the next room’. In that case van Inwagen’s metaphysical assertion ‘There are no
tables’ does not contradict what ordinary English speakers would express, not speaking
metaphysically, by uttering ‘There are tables’ – if, as he asserts, it does not contradict what
they would express, not speaking as metaphysicians, by uttering ‘there are two valuable
eighteenth century antique tables in the next room’.
With what right then does van Inwagen use this negative existential sentence of
ordinary English to express the proposition he does express by it? Why should this
proposition, of the infinite number of propositions consistent with the ordinary language
assertion ‘there are tables’ (e.g., the ones I would express by ‘there are dogs’, ‘there are no
8longer any dodos’, ‘there never were any unicorns’), be expressed in the form ‘there are no
tables’? And how are we to identify, of the innumerable true propositions consistent with the
beliefs the ordinary man would express, in the business of everyday life (van Inwagen 1990:
102), by uttering sentences that start ‘there are ... tables ...’ the one van Inwagen expresses
when he asserts ‘there are no tables’?
Van Inwagen tries to dispel the reader’s misgivings here by appeal to analogous cases,
the most developed of which is the fable of the bligers.8
English-speaking settlers in the hitherto unpeopled land of Pluralia observe what
appear to them to be black tigers. They coin the term ‘bliger’ for these animals and
occasionally comment on their activities (only occasionally because bligers keep their
distance and so the settlers seldom need to think of them). In fact, in a way, there are no
bligers. A bliger is really six animals combined together. Its ‘legs’ are four monkey-like
creatures, its ‘trunk’ a sort of sloth, and its ‘head’ a species of owl. Any six animals of the
various species can combine temporarily to form a bliger. The illusion is amazing and the
settlers are taken in.
Now van Inwagen suggests that his assertion, speaking as a metaphysician, of the
proposition he expresses by saying ‘there are no tables’, is on a par with the assertion of a
foreign zoologist who a few centuries after the settlement discovers the optical illusion and
reports it (to his zoological collegues or to the settlers) by saying ‘there are no bligers’.
However, although it is clear enough what is going on in the case of the bligers, it is
not clear how the analogy helps van Inwagen’s case. In fact, it is clear that it does not. For
even if the settlers continue to use the term ‘bliger’ after they have been informed of the
discovery, the proposition they originally used the sentence ‘there are bligers’ to assert,
8 He also gives the Copernican analogy, but this is less close (the corresponding sentences are not grammatically
existential). Anyway, this has been definitively refuted by Mackie (1993).
9namely, the existence of animals like tigers, but black in colour, has been discovered to be
false. And, crucially, it has been discovered that they had false beliefs about how things were
related at the level of simples (for they falsely believed that in the regions they thought of as
‘containing bligers’ simples were related amongst themselves much as they were in the
location of tigers – we can suppose that they have detailed knowledge of the anatomy,
physiology, biology, biochemistry etc., of tigers). It is appropriate for the zoologist to report
his discovery by using the sentence ‘there are no bligers’ because he is reporting that the
settlers’s beliefs about how things are at the level of simples is mistaken – they have been
taken in by an optical illusion. So it is appropriate for the zoologist to report his discovery in
this way because he can use this sentence to express that simples are not, in the regions the
settlers would describe as ‘containing bligers’, related to one another as the settlers believe
they are, that is, that not everything at the level of simples is as they believe. However,
nothing van Inwagen says gives reason for supposing that things are not, at the level of
simples, exactly as the ordinary man, who is prepared to assert in the business of everyday
life sentences beginning ‘There are ... tables ...’, believes them to be. In fact, it is part of van
Inwagen’s position precisely that he and I (who am such an ordinary man) might well agree
entirely about how things are arranged at the level of simples (we might disagree for
irrelevant reasons, if we have had different scientific educations, for example). So while I
know what the foreign zoologist means by reporting to his colleagues ‘there are no bligers’,
i.e., that the regions of which the settlers would say they ‘contain bligers’ actually contains
simples arranged among themselves in a way that would be a surprise to them if they were to
come to know it, I do not know, in the same way, what van Inwagen means by saying ‘there
are no tables’. In fact, one thing I can be sure he does not mean is that regions of which I
would say ‘they contain tables’ contain simples arranged amongst themselves in a way that
would surprise me if I were to learn of it. For he thinks that any such region contains simples
10
arranged ‘tablewise’, i.e., arranged amongst themselves in a way such that if they knew of it,
believers in tables like myself would find entirely unsurprising (there are, by contrast,
according to van Inwagen, no simples arranged ‘bligerwise’ in Pluralia; it is just an optical
illusion that there are).
Van Inwagen’s tale of the bligers does not, then, persuade me that the Denial may be
true. I therefore prefer to tollens van Inwagen, and draw from his argument the conclusion
that a plenitudinous (weakly) pluralist ontology is an easy consequence of our ordinary,
moderately scientifically educated, beliefs – and should be endorsed.9
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